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ADMITTING OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS IN EVALUA-
TIVE REPORTS: THE TRUSTWORTHINESS INQUIRY-Beech
Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 109 S. Ct. 439 (1988).
Abstract: In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, the United States Supreme Court held that
opinions and conclusions in evaluative reports are within the scope of the federal public
records hearsay exception if trustworthy. Washington's public records hearsay exception
excludes opinions and conclusions in evaluative reports. This Note analyzes the trustwor-
thiness requirement under the federal rule and proposes that Washington adopt the federal
rule.
The hearsay exception for public records and reports is based on a
presumption that public officials preparing reports in the course of
their employment will do so with accuracy and honesty. Evaluative
reports are of particular concern to courts because they contain opin-
ions and conclusions which may strongly influence a jury. In Beech
Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,I the United States Supreme Court held that
opinions and conclusions in evaluative reports are admissible under
Federal Rule of Evidence ("FRE") 803(8)(C) if trustworthy. The
trustworthiness inquiry will now be the focus of debate because it will
be the primary means by which trial courts exclude opinions and con-
clusions that lack reliability. Courts evaluating trustworthiness will
find guidance in the Advisory Committee's four factors and in cases
which have applied the trustworthiness requirement.
The Washington Supreme Court did not adopt FRE 803(8)(C)
when it adopted the other Federal Rules of Evidence because it deter-
mined that the subject was adequately covered by statutes and case
law. Washington's current public records exception is unduly restric-
tive because it does not provide for the admission of opinions and con-
clusions. It is ambiguous because courts interpret Washington's law
inconsistently. By adopting FRE 803(8)(C), the Washington Supreme
Court could provide clarification and improve predictability in Wash-
ington Courts.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC RECORDS
EXCEPTION
A. Hearsay Evidence and the Public Records Exception
Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the person while
testifying at the trial or hearing, which is offered into evidence to
1. 109 S. Ct. 439 (1988).
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prove the truth of the matter asserted.2 Because hearsay evidence is
not offered by the person who made the statement, it lacks reliability
and is therefore inadmissible unless it meets the requirements of an
exception.3
Both the common law and evidence rules include numerous excep-
tions to the rule against admitting hearsay.4 The exceptions exist for
situations in which circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness and
some measure of necessity or convenience are sufficient substitutes for
the declarant's presence at trial.5
The hearsay exception for public records provides that investigative
reports authorized by law and prepared by public officials are admissi-
ble.6 The presumption that a public official's reports are trustworthy
provides one basis for the public records exception.7 Officials nor-
mally prepare reports pursuant to a public duty and in connection
with their employment. They have investigative experience and an
incentive to be accurate.8 In most circumstances, neither the officials
nor the officials' employers are parties to the lawsuit or have any other
reason to be biased.
Necessity and convenience further justify admitting public records
as evidence. Public officials are not likely to remember the details of
2. FED. R. EVID. 801(c). This definition is applicable in federal courts and has been adopted
in over half the states. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 246 (3d ed. 1984 & Supp.
1987) [hereinafter MCCORMICK]; see also FED. R. EvID. 801 advisory committee's note.
3. The traditional indicia of reliability missing in hearsay are the declarant's oath, personal
presence at trial, and cross examination. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 245.
4. FRE 803 provides exceptions for, inter alia, present sense impressions, excited utterances,
recorded recollections, and public records and reports. FED. R. EVID. 803. FRE 804, applicable
only when the declarant is unavailable, provides exceptions for, inter alia, former testimony,
dying declarations, and statements against interest. FED. R. EvID. 804.
5. See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1420 (Chadburn rev. ed. 1974 & Supp. 1988) (discussion
of the theory behind the hearsay exceptions); see also FED. R. EVID. 803 and 804 advisory
committee's notes.
6. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C); 5 J. WIGMORE, supra note 5, §§ 1631-1632; see also
Grant, The Trustworthiness Standard for the Public Records and Reports Hearsay Exception, 12
WEST. ST. L. REV. 53, 55 (1984) (trustworthiness, necessity, and convenience justify the public
records hearsay exception).
7. "[S]uch reports, because they are public records based on investigations conducted
pursuant to lawful authority, are presumptively reliable." Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co.,
724 F.2d 613, 618 (8th Cir. 1983).
8. Chesapeake & Delaware Canal Co. v. United States, 250 U.S. 123, 128-29 (1919); see also
FED. R. EVID. 803(6) (the business records exception); FED. R. EVID. 803(6) advisory
committee's note. The public records exception is similar to the business records exception
because they are both based on the presumption that people preparing records in the course of
their employment will be accurate.
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reports prepared in the regular course of their employment; their testi-
mony will therefore have little value.' Officials also may be difficult to
find years after the event occurred. Moreover, the limited information
possibly gained by requiring the testimony of public officials does not
justify the inconvenience and cost of calling such Officials to testify. 0
Finally, requiring a plaintiff to duplicate an investigation because the
official is not available to testify is not cost-effective, and may even
discriminate against low-income plaintiffs. 1
B. The Controversy Concerning Evaluative Reports
Evaluative reports are public records containing opinions or conclu-
sions resulting from public officials' investigations. The admissibility
of the opinions and conclusions contained in these reports is a continu-
ing source of disagreement among courts.1 2
Opponents of the admission of opinions and conclusions express
several concerns. First, they are disturbed by the possibility that
unqualified officials might form faulty opinions or conclusions which
are admitted into evidence without challenge.13 One purpose for
cross-examination is to give a party opposing the testimony a chance
to challenge the witness' perceptions and bases for the opinion. 4
Admitting a report under a hearsay exception deprives the opposing
party of that opportunity. Courts find this argument especially com-
pelling when the official who prepared the report would not qualify as
an expert under the expert witness rules.'1'
9. "ITihere is a great likelihood that a public official would have no memory at all respecting
his actions in hundreds of entries that are little more than mechanical." Wong Wing Foo v.
McGrath, 196 F.2d 120, 123 (9th Cir. 1952).
10. Id.
11. See Note, The Trustworthiness of Government Evaluative Reports under Federal Rule of
Evidence 803(8)(C), 96 HARV. L. REv. 492, 505-06 (1982) for an argument that the undue
exclusion of evaluative reports discriminates against less wealthy litigants who cannot afford to
hire their own experts.
12. In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 109 S. Ct. 439,442-43 (1988), the Court described the
issue as a "longstanding conflict." Rainey has resolved the issue for federal courts, but state
courts which have not adopted the federal rules may decide the issue differently. See, eg., the
discussion of Washington law, infra, notes 90-115 and accompanying text.
13. See, eg., Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348, 364 (1985)
(opinions "ordinarily ought to be received only after full opportunity for examination of the
witness' credentials and full opportunity for cross examination").
14. MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 245.
15. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720, 727 n.18 (9th Cir. 1986) (if the
witness would not be permitted to testify as to opinions or conclusions when under oath and
subject to cross-examination, it makes no sense to permit the witness to testify as to opinions or
conclusions in a hearsay form), cerL denied, 479 U.S. 918 (1986).
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Biased reporting is a second important concern. Although part of
the justification for the public records exception is that public officials
are disinterested, this may not always be the case. For example, gov-
ernment agencies customarily prepare a report after an accident
occurs involving agency personnel or equipment. This report would
qualify under the public records exception. Clearly the agency has an
interest in the outcome of the investigation.' 6 This interest weakens
the presumption of unbiased reporting, one of the justifications for the
public records hearsay exception.
A third concern is that an official report may unduly influence a
jury because it is in writing and appears to be endorsed by the govern-
ment. 17 The jury may adopt without examination the opinions and
conclusions in the report instead of assessing the facts themselves.
The report will then have usurped the function of the fact-finder."'
Proponents of the admission of opinions and conclusions argue that
trustworthiness, necessity, and convenience justify the admission of
evaluative reports. They assert that judicial discretion in determining
admissibility can address and mitigate problems of investigator incom-
petence, bias, and jury misuse. Specifically, a court may exclude the
report or portions of it for undue prejudice or lack of trustworthiness,
or restrict the report's use by issuing a limiting instruction to the
jury. 19
16. For example, an agency official may be reluctant to conclude that the government was at
fault if he or she knows that the report and its conclusions may later be used against the
government at trial.
17. See United States v. MacDonald, 688 F.2d 224, 229-30 (4th Cir. 1982) (trial court did not
abuse its discretion when it refused to admit a public record into evidence because it determined
that the report would distract the jury from its task), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1103 (1983);
Comment, The Public Documents Hearsay Exception for Evaluative Reports: Fact or Fiction, 63
TUL. L. REV. 121, 141 (1988).
18. An additional concern about the admissibility of opinions and conclusions is that the
admission of these reports is unfair to a criminal defendant who cannot cross-examine his or her
accusers. See, e.g., Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, Inc., 303 Md. 581, 495 A.2d 348, 364 (1985).
The lack of cross-examination presents a serious problem in criminal cases where the
confrontation clause of the United States Constitution grants defendants the right to confront
witnesses used against them. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 252.
FRE 803(8)(C) solves this problem by excluding from its scope reports offered against a criminal
defendant. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C). Washington courts do not make this distinction. See infra
note 113 and accompanying text for a discussion of the problems with Washington's approach.
19. See, e.g., Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040, 1047 (10th Cir. 1986) (jury instruction that
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C. Federal Law
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence,2 ° circuit
courts were split over whether opinions and conclusions in evaluative
reports were admissible.21 FRE 803(8)(C) purported to resolve this
split by providing a hearsay exception for:
Records, reports, statements, or data compilations, in any form, of pub-
lic offices or agencies, setting forth... (C) in civil actions and proceed-
ings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual findings
resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by
law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate a
lack of trustworthiness. 22
Federal courts found the language of the rule, which permits the
admission of evaluative reports containing "factual findings," unclear
because the rule does not define the term "factual findings."23 Courts
also found the Advisory Committee Notes ambiguous. The Advisory
Committee accepts evaluative reports as falling within the scope of
FRE 803(8)(C), but does not specifically allow or disallow opinions
and conclusions.24 Analysis of legislative intent did not resolve the
ambiguity. The House Judiciary Committee advocated a narrow inter-
pretation that excludes opinions and conclusions.2 The Senate Judici-
ary Committee, expressing strong disagreement with the House
Committee's approach, advocated a broad interpretation that includes
the entire report.26 The two views were never reconciled. The split
among the circuits remained unresolved.
20. FED. R. EvID. 701 to End, Pub. L. No. 93-595 (1974).
21. See MCCORMICK, supra note 2, § 316 n.5.
22. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C).
23. See, eg., Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 556-57 (6th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979).
24. FED. R. EvID. 803(8)(C) advisory committee's note.
25. "The [House] Committee intends that the phrase 'factual findings' be strictly construed
and that evaluations or opinions contained in public reports shall not be admissible under this
Rule." H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 7051, 7088.
26. The Senate Committee noted:
The [Senate] committee takes strong exception to [the House Committee's] limiting
understanding of the application of the rule. We do not think it reflects an understanding of
the intended operation of the rule as explained in the Advisory Committee notes to this
subsection.... We think the restrictive interpretation of the House overlooks the fact that
while the Advisory Committee assumes admissibility in the first instance of evaluative
reports, they are not admissible if, as the rule states, 'the sources of information or other
circumstances indicate a lack of trustworthiness'.




In the leading case following the narrow interpretation, Smith v.
Ithaca Corp., 27 the widow of a deceased sailor offered into evidence a
Coast Guard report containing a conclusion that the decedent was
exposed to harmful levels of benzene vapors.28 The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals held that the conclusion in the report was inadmissible
under FRE 803(8)(C).2 9 The court emphasized the difference between
the language in FRE 803(8)(C) and the language in FRE 803(6), the
business records exception, which expressly allows opinion testi-
mony.30 The court concluded that the use of the term "factual find-
ings" in FRE 803(8)(C) instead of the term "opinions" as used in FRE
803(6) indicated that Congress did not intend for opinions to be
admissible under FRE 803(8)(C).31
The majority of the circuits adopted a broader interpretation of the
term "factual findings."32 In Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp.,33 the Sixth
Circuit upheld the admission of a police accident report in a civil case,
including the investigator's finding that one of the cars ran a red
light.34 The court agreed with the Senate Judiciary Committee's con-
clusion that the purpose of the statute as defined by the Advisory
Committee was to admit entire reports, including opinions and conclu-
sions, unless they are untrustworthy. 35
II. BEECH AIRCRAFT CORP. V RAINEY
A. Facts and Disposition
In Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey,3 6 the United States Supreme
Court held that FRE 803(8)(C)'s exception for evaluative reports
extends to opinions and conclusions contained in such reports. The
case arose after a Navy flight instructor and her student were killed
27. 612 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1980).
28. Id. at 223 n.20.
29. Id. at 223.
30. Id. at 221-222. FRE 803(6) provides a hearsay exception for "[a] memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, .. . if
kept in the course of a regularly conducted business activity." FED. R. EvID. 803(6).
31. 612 F.2d at 221-22. The Ithaca court also relied on the Coast Guard's own regulations,
which expressly state that such investigations are not intended to fix civil or criminal liability.
The court reasoned that such a restriction is a sufficient negative factor weighing against the
evidentiary use of the opinions or conclusions contained in a report. Id. at 222.
32. See, e.g., Perrin v. Anderson, 784 F.2d 1040, 1046-47 (10th Cir. 1986).
33. 588 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1978).
34. The finding was based on a physical investigation and an interview with one of the
drivers. Id. at 554.
35. Id. at 557.
36. 109 S. Ct. 439 (1988).
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when their Navy aircraft crashed during training exercises.37 The
pilots' surviving spouses ifed suit against the companies that manufac-
tured and serviced the aircraft, claiming that equipment malfunction
caused the accident."8 As part of their defense, the defendants offered
into evidence an Air Force Judge Advocate General Report which
contained the investigator's conclusion that pilot error was the most
probable cause of the accident.3 9 The trial court held that the report,
including the investigator's conclusion, was admissible.'
A panel of the Eleventh Circuit, considering itself bound by Smith v.
Ithaca Corp.,4 held that the conclusions contained in the report
should not have been admitted, and reversed the trial court holding.42
On rehearing en banc, the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed the panel deci-
sion.43 The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that FRE
803(8)(C) does not call for a distinction between facts and opinions or
conclusions contained in evaluative reports.'
B. Reasoning of the Court
The Court's analysis began with an interpretation of the statutory
language. The Court found that a common definition of "factual find-
ings" includes conclusions reasonably inferred from the evidence.45
Furthermore, the rule states that "reports ... setting forth.., factual
findings" are admissible, not that "factual findings" are admissible.46
This language authorizes a court to admit entire reports that contain
factual findings, not just factual findings contained in the reports. No
language in the text justifies creating a distinction between facts and
opinions contained in evaluative reports.4 7
37. Id. at 441.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 444. Because of the extensive damage to the plane and the lack of any survivors,
the cause of the accident could not be determined with certainty. Id. at 443.
40. Id.
41. 612 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1980). The Eleventh Circuit, iln Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661
F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981), adopted as precedent decisions of the Fifth Circuit rendered
prior to October 1, 1981. See discussion of Ithaca, supra notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
42. Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 784 F.2d 1523, 1528 (11th Cir. 1986).
43. Rainey v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 827 F.2d 1498, 1500 (11th Cir. 1987). The rehearing was
held for the purpose of reconsidering the precedent in the circuit. The en banc court was evenly
divided on the issue, however, so the Eleventh Circuit law remained unchanged. Id. A strong
concurrence urged the Eleventh Circuit to reconsider its interpretation of FRE 803(8)(C). Id. at
1501-16.
44. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 109 S. Ct. 439, 449 (1988).





The Court did not agree with the analysis in Smith v. Ithaca Corp.
that emphasizes the difference between the language in FRE 803(8)(C)
and the language in FRE 803(6) which specifically includes opinions."
The Court noted that the legislative history of FRE 803(6) explains
the difference-the Advisory Committee wanted to expand the tradi-
tional business records exception to include medical diagnoses and
opinions.49
The Court determined that, although the legislative history is
ambiguous, the broad interpretation advocated by the Senate Commit-
tee is more in accord with the wording of the rule and with the Advi-
sory Committee's comments.5" The Court noted that the Advisory
Committee's comments made no mention of a dichotomy in the treat-
ment of facts and opinions or conclusions.51
The Court explained that the rule's requirements and other evidence
rules provide the necessary safeguards. Opinions, to be admissible
under FRE 803(8)(C), must be based on factual findings. The trial
judge has the discretion to exclude an entire report or any portion of it
if the judge determines that it is untrustworthy.5" This trustworthi-
ness inquiry is a more logical basis for determining the admissibility of
evidence than the analytically difficult distinction between fact and
opinion.53
The Court pointed out that the traditional rules limiting the admis-
sibility of evidence continue to apply to evaluative reports.54 Evidence
may be excluded under FRE 402 if not relevant, 55 or under Rule 403 if
unduly prejudicial. 56 Furthermore, the opponent always has the right
to present contradictory evidence or otherwise challenge a report or its
48. Id. See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text for the Ithaca court's analysis.
49. 109 S. Ct. at 446 n.8.
50. Id. at 448. The Advisory Committee's solution is found in the final paragraph of its
report: Admissibility is assumed unless "sufficient negative factors are present." Id. (citing FED.
R. EVID. 803(8)(C) advisory committee's note).
51. "What was on the Committee's mind was simply whether what it called 'evaluative
reports' should be admissible." Id.
52. Id. at 448-49.
53. Id. at 449.
54. Id.
55. "Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible." FED. R. EVID. 402. Relevant
evidence is defined as "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence." FED. R. EvID. 401.
56. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or
by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." FED. R. EvID. 403.
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findings in the presence of the trier of fact.57 Finally, the Court stated
that this broad approach is consistent with the Federal Rules' general
trend of relaxing the barriers to opinion testimony. 8
III. FEDERAL LAW AFTER RAINEY: THE
TRUSTWORTHINESS INQUIRY DETERMINES
ADMISSIBILITY OF OPINIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
IN EVALUATIVE REPORTS
The Rainey decision resolved the conflict among the circuits about
whether opinions and conclusions are admissible under FRE
803(8)(C). 59 The Court held that opinions and conclusions based on
factual findings are admissible if trustworthy, and that the burden is
on the party opposing admission to prove untrustworthiness.60  The
Court did not define trustworthiness, and instead supported the Advi-
sory Committee's intention to make the trustworthiness inquiry a mat-
ter of the trial court's discretion. 61  Because the outcome of the
trustworthiness inquiry will determine the admissibility of evaluative
reports, future controversy over the application of FRE 803(8)(C) will
focus on the trustworthiness requirement.
57. Rainey, 109 S. Ct. at 449.
58. Id. at 450.
59. The Rainey Court expressly declined to address whether legal conclusions contained in
evaluative reports are admissible under FRE 803(8)(C). Id. at 450 n.13. However, if the Court
were to apply the same statutory analysis to legal conclusions that it applied to factual opinions
and conclusions, legal conclusions would not be admissible. The court relied on the definition of
"findings of fact" in Black's Law Dictionary. Id. at 447. Black's definition of "findings of fact"
includes opinions and conclusions based on facts, but does not include, and is defined separately
from, "findings of law." BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 324 (5th ed. 1983).
Furthermore, legal conclusions, even if admissible under the language of the rule, would not be
admissible in court because they would be outside an investigator's area of expertise and
therefore untrustworthy. Legal conclusions require legal expertise, and most investigators will
not be qualified to render such conclusions. See the discussion of the importance of an
investigator's expertise, infra, notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
The expert witness rules provide guidance here as well. FRE 704 provides that experts may
give opinions as to ultimate facts, but cannot give opinions as to matters of law or mixed law and
fact. FED. R. EvID. 704 comment.
60. 109 S. Ct. at 450. Placing the burden on the opposing party makes sense. The hearsay
exception is based on the presumption that investigations performed by public officials are
reliable. To require the party seeking admission to prove reliability each time a report is offered
would be unfair. "[I]t is far more equitable to place that burden on the party seeking to
demonstrate why a time tested and carefully considered presumption is not appropriate." Ellis v.
International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 301 (4th Cir. 1984).
61. Rainey, 109 S. Ct. at 448-49.
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A. The Trustworthiness Inquiry
An analysis of trustworthiness must begin with the Advisory Com-
mittee's notes. The Committee provided guidance by listing four fac-
tors which it felt would help courts in assessing trustworthiness.62
These factors are: (1) the timeliness of the investigation; (2) the special
skill or experience of the official; (3) the level of any hearing con-
ducted; and (4) the possibility of investigator bias.6 3 The Advisory
Committee's factors broadly define the nature of a court's inquiry.
The list is not specific, nor is it exclusive. The Advisory Committee
merely provided a starting point for the analysis.'
A court applying the trustworthiness inquiry could also benefit from
the court's analysis in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Indus-
trial Co.6 5  In Zenith, the trial court applied the trustworthiness
inquiry to public records and reports from several agencies.66 The
court began its analysis with the four Advisory Committee factors and
then added seven more specific factors.67 Zenith's factors build upon
the Advisory Committee's factors; they are not independent. Zenith's
factors define specific areas which should be addressed by courts when
determining the trustworthiness of public reports.
The Advisory Committee's factors, refined by Zenith, and applied in
other federal cases, provide guidance to courts. The following analysis
62. FED. R. EVID. 803(8)(C) advisory committee's note.
63. Id.
64. "The formulation of an approach which would give appropriate weight to all possible
factors in every situation is an obvious impossibility." Id.
65. 505 F. Supp. 1125 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub nor. In re Japanese
Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574
(1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987).
66. In this pretrial hearing on Japanese electronic products antitrust litigation, the court had
to rule on several types of evaluative reports, including documents from the U.S. Treasury
Department and the U.S. Tariff Commission, findings arising out of proceedings under the Trade
Expansion Act and Trade Act, records and findings of the Japanese Fair Trade Commission, and
a report from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 505 F. Supp. at
1138.
67. The seven additional factors are as follows: (I) the finality of the agency findings and the
likelihood of their modification or reversal; (2) the extent to which the agency findings are based
upon proceedings relying on material which would be inadmissible evidence, and the extent to
which such material is supplied by persons with an interest in the outcome of the proceeding; (3)
the extent to which any hearings used appropriate safeguards and the extent to which any
investigations complied with all applicable agency regulations and procedures; (4) the extent to
which an ascertainable record exists on which the findings are based; (5) the extent to which the
findings are a function of executive, administrative, or legislative policy judgment or
implementation; (6) the extent to which the findings are based upon findings of another
investigative body or tribunal which is itself untrustworthy; and (7) the extent to which any facts
or data relied on by an expert are of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field. Id. at 1147.
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includes the Zenith factors and the analysis from other relevant federal
cases in the discussion of the Advisory Committee's factors.
B. Applying the Trustworthiness Inquiry
1. The Timeliness of the Investigation
The first Advisory Committee factor is the timeliness of the investi-
gation. A timely investigation is important because it can make use of
fresh information. For example, when the subject of the investigation
is an accident, an investigator who arrives quickly at the scene of an
accident is more likely to be able to gather physical evidence and find
witnesses. In addition, an investigator who speaks to witnesses early is
more likely to receive accounts of the accident that are untainted by
the influence of parties to the litigation.68
Timeliness will be more important to investigations of accidents
than to other types of investigations where evidence is not as likely to
disappear or become tainted.69 If the report is the result of a study, or
is based on information contained in documents, timeliness is less crit-
ical.7 0 In fact, time taken to complete the study or evaluate the infor-
mation contained in documents may be an indication of thoroughness.
Timeliness also may be less relevant when the report is a result of
hearings, in which case the focus should be on the reliability of the
hearings.71
68. The Advisory Committee Notes refer to Professor McCormick who supports the greater
admissibility of investigative reports with the following:
The most important reason is time. The officer comes on the scene usually as early as it is
feasible to get there. Usually the investigators of the parties come later and the statements
they take are frequently partial and one-sided .... The officer is often able to interview
witnesses before they have been pulled one way or the other by the parties.
MCCORMICK, Can the Courts Make Wider Use of Reports of Official Investigations?, 42 IOWA L.
REV. 363, 365 (1957) [hereinafter Wider Use of Reports].
69. Compare Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551, 554 (6th Cir. 1978) (investigation
of car accident found trustworthy, in part, because the investigator arrived at the accident scene
within six minutes), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979) with Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d
720, 726 (9th Cir. 1986) (investigation of atomic simulator accident found untrustworthy, in
part, because the investigator arrived at the accident scene over a week after the accident), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 918 (1986).
70. See, eg., Ellis v. International Playtex, Inc., 745 F.2d 292, 303 (4th Cir. 1984)
(epidemiological study was considered timely for purposes of FRE 803(8)(C) despite the fact that
interviews with those affected with toxic shock syndrome occurred several months after the
alleged occurrence of the illness).
71. See the discussion of hearings, infra text accompanying notes 82-84.
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2. Special Skill or Experience of the Official
The second Advisory Committee factor is the special skill or experi-
ence of the investigating official. Part of the justification for the public
records hearsay exception is the presumption that public officials who
perform investigations in the course of their employment have the
experience needed to form accurate conclusions from the evidence.72
Investigators who lack the necessary experience fail to meet this pre-
sumption. Their opinions and conclusions should therefore not be
admitted.73
Investigators should, at a minimum, meet the standards provided
under the expert witness rules before a court finds the opinions and
conclusions contained in their reports trustworthy. It would be anom-
alous to admit a report under a hearsay exception when the preparer
of the report would not be permitted to give the same testimony in
court as an expert witness.74 Under the FRE, a witness may testify as
an expert if that witness' scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will be helpful to the jury. 5 An expert may give an opin-
ion based on facts and data not admissible at trial if the data relied on
are "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field." 76
Under the broad standards for specialized knowledge, an exper-
ienced investigator probably will qualify as an expert in his or her field
of investigation, while an inexperienced or untrained investigator will
not. Of course, the level of required experience will vary depending on
the difficulty of the field of investigation. If an investigator does not
qualify under the expert witness standards, then the opinions and con-
clusions contained in that investigator's report should not be admitted
at trial.77
72. The Advisory Committee cites Professor McCormick, who describes the presumption of
expertise: "The officer, too, is frequently a specialist-a doctor reporting a death, a fire marshal
investigating a fire-or at least experienced in like investigations, such as a highway patrolman
reporting on a collision." Wider Use of Reports, supra note 68, at 365.
73. See, e.g., Fraley v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 470 F. Supp. 1264, 1267 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (JAG
report prepared after an airplane crash held inadmissible because it was prepared by an
inexperienced investigator in a highly complex field of investigation). Note, however, that in a
related case another court admitted the same report under FRE 803(8)(C). Sage v. Rockwell
Int'l Corp., 477 F. Supp. 1205, 1209 (N.H. 1979).
74. Jenkins v. Whittaker Corp., 785 F.2d 720, 727 n.18. (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied 479 U.S.
918 (1986).
75. FED. R. EvID. 702.
76. FED. R. EVID. 703.
77. If the investigator is not sufficiently qualified, the court must then decide whether to
exclude the entire report or to exclude only those parts that contain opinions or conclusions. The
decision will be a matter of judicial discretion. If parts of a report would be helpful to the jury
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The expert witness rules permit an expert to rely on anything rea-
sonably relied upon by experts in the field.7 8 This standard is reason-
able for evaluative reports, and is one of the factors added by Zenith.7 9
If an investigator has enough specialized knowledge to qualify under
the expert witness rules, then any opinions or conclusions formed by
that investigator may be admissible, even if the expert bases the opin-
ion in part on hearsay. To require a party to prove that each piece of
information relied upon by the investigator was otherwise admissible
would be impractical. There is no evidence that the drafters of the
FRE contemplated such a requirement.
Zenith added two additional factors addressing the credibility of the
underlying facts or data: Whether the information relied on would be
admissible in court, and the extent to which any findings are based on
findings of another investigation which itself might be untrustwor-
thy.8" Although a report may be trustworthy even if it is based on
evidence that would be inadmissible in court, a court has the discre-
tion to decide that a predominance of evidence that is highly unrelia-
ble renders a report untrustworthy. The court must consider the data
as a whole by evaluating the nature and source of the inadmissible
evidence relied on as well as the other evidence supporting the
conclusion. 1
The use of the expert witness rules when determining trustworthi-
ness effectively addresses the concern about incompetent or unquali-
fied investigators. Courts will exclude opinions and conclusions
contained in reports that are prepared by investigators with no special-
ized knowledge or are based on unreliable facts or data.
and those parts appear reliable, either because they are in the preparer's area of expertise or
because they do not include matters of judgment or discretion on the part of the preparer, then
those parts of a report should be admitted.
78. FED. R. EVID. 703.
79. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1125, 1147 (E.D. Pa.
1980), aff'd in part, rev'd in part sub noma. In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d
238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 475 U.S. 574 (1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029
(1987).
80. 505 F. Supp. at 1147.
81. See, eg., Baker v. Elcona Homes Corp., 588 F.2d 551,554 (6th Cir. 1978) (police accident
report based on physical circumstances, vector analysis, and interviews with witnesses held
admissible), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 933 (1979); Miller v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 697 F.2d 141,
144 (6th Cir. 1983) (police accident report based solely on interviews with witnesses held
inadmissible). The Miller court distinguished Baker in two important ways: the conclusions in
Baker were based on independently verifiable facts, and the investigator was qualified as an
expert in accident reconstruction. Miller, 697 F.2d at 143.
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3. A Hearing and the Level at Which Conducted
The third Advisory Committee factor is whether a hearing was held
and, if so, the level at which it was conducted. The Committee cites
Franklin v. Skelly Oil,8 a case which supports the proposition that the
lack of a hearing is a factor weighing against trustworthiness. In
Skelly Oil, the trial court held inadmissible a letter written by an
inspector to the fire marshall expressing the inspector's opinion as to
the cause of the fire. The appeals court reasoned that given all the
circumstances surrounding the letter, including the fact that there was
no hearing, the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied
admissibility.83
The Zenith court, faced with numerous documents resulting from
investigations including hearings, added to the analysis the finality of
the hearings, the procedural safeguards used, and the existence of an
ascertainable record.84 If the findings are made in the beginning of a
protracted process which provides for review or reversal, then the
findings should be considered less trustworthy than findings which are
final and adopted by the agency. The extent to which the hearing
includes procedural safeguards and includes an ascertainable record
also should affect the credibility of the findings. A hearing does not
guarantee trustworthiness. The quality of the hearing must be
assessed, along with all other trustworthiness criteria.
4. The Possibility of Biased Reporting
The fourth Advisory Committee factor is possible bias of the inves-
tigator. The Committee cites the case of Palmer v. Hoffman 85 for gui-
dance. In Palmer, the Court held that an accident report prepared by
an engineer involved in the accident was inadmissible under the busi-
ness records hearsay exception because he prepared his report in the
course of litigation, not in the course of business.86 The court rea-
soned that a report prepared for litigation purposes is not presump-
tively reliable.
Both the business records and the public records exceptions assume
that people in the course of employment have an incentive to perform
their jobs with accuracy and honesty.87 When an employee preparing
82. 141 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1944).
83. Id. at 572.
84. 505 F. Supp. at 1147.
85. 318 U.S. 109 (1943).
86. Id. at 113.
87. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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either type of record has a reason to be biased, such as upcoming liti-
gation, a court should find the employee's opinions and conclusions
untrustworthy.
Zenith takes this analysis further by focusing on agency bias. Not
only is a report untrustworthy if the preparer is biased, or if the report
uses information received from biased witnesses, but the report is
untrustworthy if its conclusions are a result of the agency's policy
judgment or implementation.88 This extension of the inquiry into
potential bias makes sense. If an agency has goals that will be either
met or undermined by the conclusions reached in a report, 'the
employee will have the incentive to be biased that the Advisory Com-
mittee cautioned against when it referred to Palmer. 8 9 An employee's
bias should weigh against the admission of a report containing self-
serving opinions and conclusions by that employee.
5. Other Indicia of Unreliability
The hearsay exception for public records and reports is based on the
presumption that such reports are prepared by experienced public offi-
cials who have incentive to be accurate and no reason to be biased.
The trustworthiness inquiry requires that courts compare this pre-
sumption to the circumstances of a particular report. When the cir-
cumstances of a report do not justify the presumption, the report
should not be admitted under the hearsay exception.
The Advisory Committee's four factors provide a foundation for the
trustworthiness analysis. Because the factors are broad, however,
courts will want to look elsewhere for further guidance. Zenith's fac-
tors define specific areas which should be addressed in most public
records. Other federal cases help to identify the issues. But because
courts will have to examine a diverse range of evaluative reports, no
checklist will suffice. Courts may start with the Advisory Committee's
factors, but they will not finish until they carefully consider all of the
indicia of reliability or unreliability contained in any particular report.
88. 505 F. Supp. at 1149.
89. See, eg., Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 810, 814 (D.D.C. 1987)
(documents prepared by Congress, "a politically-motivated partisan body," held untrustworthy).
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IV. WASHINGTON LAW: AN ARGUMENT FOR ADOPTING
THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE
A. Washington's Public Records Hearsay Exception
In 1978, the Washington Supreme Court adopted a new evidence
code which incorporated most of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 90
The court declined to adopt FRE 803(8), not because of any disagree-
ment with it, but because the drafters determined that the subject mat-
ter was adequately covered by statutory and case law.9' Washington
Rule of Evidence ("ER") 803(a)(8) 92 refers to Revised Code of Wash-
ington ("RCW") section 5.44.040, 9 3 which reflects the drafters' intent
to retain the statute as the public records hearsay exception. 94
Courts found the language of RCW section 5.44.040 ambiguous and
did not apply the statute in a consistent manner before the adoption of
the federal rules. Some courts interpreted the statute as the public
records hearsay exception, 95 while others ignored the statute and
applied a common law public records hearsay exception.96 Further-
more, some later cases considered RCW section 5.44.040 merely an
authentication statute.97
In contrast, courts were consistent in their treatment of opinions
and conclusions contained in evaluative reports. They interpreted
both the statute and the common law rule to provide only for admis-
sion of facts, not opinions or conclusions.98
90. WASH. R. EvID. 101-1103.
91. WASH. R. EvID. 803 comment.
92. This would have been the equivalent of FRE 803(8) if Washington had adopted it.
93. WASH. REV. CODE § 5.44.040 (1987) provides:
Certified copies of public records as evidence. Copies of all records and documents on
record or on file in the offices of the various departments of the United States and of this
state, when duly certified by the respective officers having by law the custody thereof, under
their respective seals where such officers have official seals, shall be admitted in evidence in
the courts of this state.
94. See Washington Judicial Counsel, Minutes of the September 11, 1976 Meeting 3 (copy on
file with Washington Law Review).
95. See, e.g., State v. King, 9 Wash. App. 389, 393, 512 P.2d 771, 773 (1973).
96. See, e.g., Grant v. Fisher Flouring Mills Co., 190 Wash. 356, 372, 68 P.2d 210, 215
(1937); 5B K. TEGLAND, WASHINGTON PRACTICE § 375 (3d ed. 1989).
97. See, e.g., State v. Thompson, 35 Wash. App. 766, 770, 669 P.2d 1270, 1272 (1983); R.
ARONSON, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN WASHINGTON 803-42 to 803-43 (1989).
98. See, e.g., Steel v. Johnson, 9 Wash. 2d 347, 358, 115 P.2d 145, 150 (1941). Opinions are
also excluded from admission under Washington's business records hearsay exception. Young v.
Liddington, 50 Wash. 2d 78, 84, 309 P.2d 761, 764 (1957). The federal courts and most other
state courts now permit the admission of opinions in business records. See FED. RULE EVID.
803(6); FED. RULE EVID. 803(6) advisory committee's notes; discussion of FRE 803(6) supra
notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
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B. Recent Cases Interpreting the Public Records Hearsay Exception
Several recent appeals court cases have addressed the public records
exception using varied reasoning.99 In Kaye v. State Department of
Licensing, 1o the court of appeals held that a police officer's report,
which stated that the driver refused to take a breathalyzer test, was
inadmissible in a drivers license revocation proceeding because it con-
tained conclusions.101 The court explained that although RCW sec-
tion 5.44.040 had been interpreted as the public records exception, for
a document to fit within this exception it must contain facts and not
conclusions or the expression of opinion. 2 The officer's report was
inadmissible because it consisted of merely a printed form setting forth
conclusory language. 103
In State v. Dibley, 1o the court of appeals refused to admit a third
party's plea bargain against a criminal defendant under RCW section
5.44.040 on the basis that the statute only provides for authentica-
tion.105 The court acknowledged that RCW section 5.44.040 had been
recognized in the past as the public records hearsay exception, but
questioned whether that interpretation still would apply after the
adoption of the ER.'06 The court did not explain how it concluded
that the hearsay exception was no longer valid.
In Cantu v. Seattle, 10 7 the court of appeals looked to federal cases
for guidance when it upheld the trial court's decision not to admit
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") determina-
tions in a civil employment discrimination case.' 08 The court relied on
federal Title VII cases and stated that the admissibility of EEOC
determinations is based on FRE 803(8)(C).'0 9 The court adopted a
99. See State v. Monson, 53 Wash. App. 854, 856-57, 771 P.2d 359, 360 (1989) (discussing
several different interpretations of Washington's public records hearsay exception). The
Washington Supreme Court has not addressed the issue.
100. 34 Wash. App. 132, 659 P.2d 548 (1983).
101. Id. at 133, 659 P.2d at 549.
102. Id. at 133-134, 659 P.2d at 549.
103. Id. at 134, 659 P.2d at 549.
104. 38 Wash. App. 824, 691 P.2d 209 (1984).
105. Id. at 826, 691 P.2d at 212. "A document can be what it purports to be and still be
unreliable hearsay." Id. at 828-29, 691 P.2d at 212.
106. Id. at 828-29 n.4, 691 P.2d at 212 n.4. But see State v. Monson, 53 Wash. App. 854,
857, 771 P.2d 359, 360 (1989) (the Washington Supreme Court did not intend to eliminate the
public records exception by mere nonadoption of the federal rule).
107. 51 Wash. App. 95, 752 P.2d 390 (1988).
108. Id. at 100, 752 P.2d at 392.
109. Id. at 99, 752 P.2d at 392.
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discretionary standard which allows for the admission of EEOC find-
ings, including opinions and conclusions, if trustworthy. 110 The court
did not mention RCW section 5.44.040.
C. Washington's Public Records Hearsay Exception Is Unduly
Restrictive and Confusing
Washington's public records exception, by excluding opinions and
conclusions in evaluative reports, excludes evidence that would be
helpful to the trier of fact. Under Washington's rule, any opinions or
conclusions, regardless of their trustworthiness and importance to the
case, will be excluded. For example, consider the following scenario:
An experienced police officer arrives at the scene of an accident imme-
diately, observes the accident scene, interviews witnesses, and con-
cludes that one of the cars was speeding. In Washington, the
conclusion in this report would not be admissible even though the
information is trustworthy and could be critical to the disposition of
the case. This blanket exclusion of valuable evidence hinders the jury's
fact-finding effort.
Furthermore, Washington's current public records exception is con-
fusing. Courts inconsistently interpret RCW section 5.44.040, and the
Dibley court openly questioned the statute's validity as a public
records hearsay exception after the adoption of the FRE. The fact
that the Cantu court relied on federal law, rather than Washington
law, for guidance in formulating a new rule for EEOC reports further
demonstrates the state of confusion.
D. Washington Could Improve its Public Records Exception by
Following Rainey
The admission of trustworthy opinions and conclusions as provided
under FRE 803(8)(C) would significantly improve Washington's pub-
lic records hearsay exception. Juries would be better equipped to per-
form their fact-finding function with all trustworthy information at
their disposal. The safeguards built into the Rule, such as the require-
ment that the report be based on facts, the trustworthiness inquiry, the
lack of admissibility against criminal defendants, and the continued
110. Id. at 99, 752 P.2d at 392; cf. Plummer v. Western Int'l Hotels Co., 656 F.2d 502, 505
(9th Cir. 1981) (EEOC reports brought under Title VII actions are per se admissible).
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use of the other Rules of Evidence that limit the admission of evi-
dence, reduce the risks associated with admitting opinions and
conclusions. 11
By adopting FRE 803(8)(C), the Washington Supreme Court also
would resolve the confusion that follows from the inconsistent inter-
pretations of RCW section 5.44.040. Washington courts would have a
definitive public records exception and federal case law for guidance.
The three recent Washington cases could have been decided on a
principled basis under FRE 803(8)(C). The Kaye court followed
Washington's traditional approach of excluding opinions and conclu-
sions when it held a conclusory police report inadmissible under RCW
5.44.040. Under FRE 803(8)(C), however, the report would be con-
sidered presumptively reliable and admissible in a civil proceeding.112
This is a better result. A police report indicating that a driver refused
to take a breathalyzer test provides important evidence to the trier of
fact. If there were any indication that the report was not trustworthy,
such as police misconduct or bias, the court could prevent the report's
admission. Absent these indicia of unreliability, the report would be
admitted for the trier of fact to evaluate.
Perhaps the court did not apply the public records exception in
Dibley because the report was a third party's plea bargain offered
against a criminal defendant. Washington courts, when applying the
public records hearsay exception, have never distinguished between
reports used against civil litigants and those used against criminal
defendants. Part of Washington's reluctance to admit opinions and
conclusions contained in public reports may be due to concerns that
an expansion of the rule might violate criminal defendants' constitu-
tional rights.113
Dibley would have come out the same under FRE 803(8)(C), but the
analysis would have been clear and predictable. Under FRE
803(8)(C) this report would have been inadmissible, but solely because
the evidence was being offered against a criminal defendant. The
I 11. For many of the same reasons, Washington could also consider changing the business
records exception to admit opinions.
112. A drivers license revocation proceeding is not a criminal matter. Brewer v. Department
of Motor Vehicles, 23 Wash. App. 412, 414, 595 P.2d 949, 950 (1979). The same report would
not be admissible in a criminal matter under FRE 803(8)(C). See supra note 18.
113. See R. ARONSON, supra note 97, at 803-43. In State v. Dibley, the court held that the
document was admissible under ER 804(b)(3), which provides a hearsay exception for statements
against interest when the declarant is unavailable. 38 Wash. App. 824, 829, 691 P.2d 209, 212
(1984). Because use of this rule is restricted to cases where the declarant is unavailable, it is less




FRE's exclusion of reports offered against criminal defendants deci-
sively solves the confrontation clause problem.
Both the holding and the analysis in Cantu would be unchanged
under the FRE because the Cantu court used the FRE for guidance.
If Washington had adopted FRE 803(8)(C), the holding would have
been predictable. The rule developed by Cantu for EEOC findings is
the same rule used under FRE 803(8)(C): A trustworthy report is
admissible, and an untrustworthy report is not.
E. Implementing the Change
The Washington Supreme Court has the power to promulgate rules
of evidence that will supercede any conflicting statute."1 4 The court
could, therefore, adopt FRE 803(8)(C) and provide lower courts with
the guidance of Rainey, Zenith, and other federal cases.' 15 Washing-
ton courts would then admit trustworthy opinions and conclusions in
evaluative reports unless the presumptions on which the hearsay
exception is based are undermined by indicia of unreliability in a par-
ticular report.
The adoption of FRE 803(8)(C) in Washington would allow Wash-
ington fact finders access to trustworthy and relevant opinions and
conclusions. The new rule would further the interests of clarity, relia-
bility, and predictability which the Washington Supreme Court sup-
ported when it adopted the other Washington Rules of Evidence.
V. CONCLUSION
Rainey held that opinions and conclusions contained in evaluative
reports are admissible in federal courts if trustworthy. The safeguards
provided by the trustworthiness inquiry ensure that reports which are
biased, misleading, or inaccurate are not presented to the jury. More-
over, the other federal rules limiting the admissibility of evidence will
prevent the admission of reports which are unduly prejudicial or
irrelevant.
Washington could improve its public records hearsay exception by
adopting FRE 803(8)(C) and following Rainey. The federal rule
would change Washington's law to include the admission of opinions
114. WASH. REV. CODE §§ 2.04.190-.200 (1987).
115. If the Supreme Court were to adopt FRE 803(8)(C), then WASH. REV. CODE § 5.44.040
could be applied as an authentication statute consistent with some courts' current
interpretations. The statute would have no effect as a hearsay exception. WASH. REV. CODE
§ 2.04.200 (1987).
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and conclusions contained in evaluative reports and would provide
coherent precedent for Washington courts to follow.
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